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DETENTIONS, MILITARY
COMMISSIONS, TERRORISM, AND
DOMESTIC CASE PRECEDENT
CARL TOBIAS*

INTRODUCTION
Laura Dickinson's recent article in this journal substantially improves
appreciation of how the United States has detained suspects and instituted
military commissions as well as of the roles played by the controversial
procedure and tribunals when fighting terrorism. 1 She meticulously traces
how detentions and the commissions evolved, trenchantly criticizes them,
and persuasively shows international tribunals' comparative advantage.
Dickinson accords relevant domestic case precedent a somewhat laconic
analysis, however. For example, she briefly mentions separation-of-powers
concerns and Supreme Court opinions that detentions and military
commissions implicate while rather tersely assessing Ex parte Quirin, the
Second World War decision on which President George W. Bush's
Administration has heavily relied to detain suspects, to create the tribunals,
and to support numerous antiterrorism initiatives, especially litigation. 2
Dickinson suggests that closer evaluation of these critical rulings is
unwarranted because they lack application for her work and others have
Beckley Singleton Professor, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las
Vegas; Visiting Williams Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. I wish to thank Raquel
Aldana, Chris Bryant, Angela Morrison, and Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions, Judy Canter for
processing this piece, and Beckley Singleton, James E. Rogers, and Russell Williams for generous,
continuing support. Errors that remain are mine.
1. See Laura A. Dickinson, Using Legal Process to Fight Terrorism: Detentions, Military
Commissions, International Tribunals, and the Rule of law, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1407 (2002).
2. 317 U.S. 1 (1942). See generally LOUIS FISHER, NAZI SABOTEURS ON TRIAL (2003)
(analyzing the legal and factual background of Quirin); EUGENE RACHLIS, THEY CAME TO KILL: THE
STORY OF EIGHT NAZI SABOTEURS IN AMERICA ( 1961) (analyzing the factual background of Quirin).
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explored the opinions. 3 Dickinson's treatment allows many observers,
most prominently cabinet members and federal judges, to overstate Quirin
and to ignore Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 4
Dickinson contributes substantially to the ongoing debate over the use
of detentions and military commissions in national emergencies. She
illuminates myriad complex phenomena and convincingly demonstrates
how international tribunals are preferable. Her recommendation may prove
superior in terms of theory, policy, and international law. Nonetheless, the
very realpolitik that Dickinson so incisively criticizes, and is so clearly
exemplified by the Bush Administration's war on terrorism, mandates
elaboration of the governing United States case law.
Several reasons now dictate careful scrutiny. Most important, the
President and his advisors have profoundly enlarged reliance on Quirin
since September 11, 2001. For instance, they cite the decision to
substantiate the November 2001 Executive Order ("Bush Order") that
established the military commissions and the March 2002 Department of
Defense ("DOD") regulations that implemented this Order. 5 The Attorney
General and the Secretary of Defense as well as additional influential
policymakers have invoked the opinion when testifying in support of
antiterrorism measures. The Departments of Justice ("DOJ") and Defense
have used that ruling to detain individuals suspected of terrorist activities
and to pursue crucial terrorism litigation, and some federal courts have
adopted the government's perspective. Quite simply, global opinion, the
rule of law, civil liberties, and the integrity of the federal government's
branches are at stake.
These propositions mean that the applicable domestic cases, namely
Quirin and Youngstown, deserve thorough explication, which this response
to Dickinson's valuable article undertakes. I first descriptively assess her
significant contribution. My response then analyzes how the Bush
3.
In fairness, Dickinson expressly states that many rule-of-law "arguments have been made
elsewhere, and so [Part II is primarily intended as an overview." Dickinson, supra note I, at 1413.
Moreover, she affords valuable, albeit compressed, treatment of Quirin. See id. at 1420-21. The
precise realpolitik that she so cogently criticizes, as well as executive and judicial use of Quirin to date,
shows that relevant precedents warrant scrutiny, however.
4. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). See generally MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE
CASE: THE LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER (1977) (analyzing the legal and factual background of

Youngstown).
5. See Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001) [hereinafter Bush
Order]; DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, MILITARY COMMISSION ORDER No. 1 (Mar. 21, 2002), available at
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/mco/mcol .pdf (last visited July 26, 2003) )hereinafter DOD
ORDER]; infra notes 27-38, 56-95 and accompanying text.
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Administration and federal judges have applied the precedent and why their
reliance is misplaced. I find that the government has depended on Quirin
to establish military tribunals, detain terrorism suspects, and litigate
terrorism cases-and several judges have approved of this usage. Part II
demonstrates that this decision cannot support the notions for which it has
been invoked. Moreover, those dynamics promise to worsen as the war on
terrorism broadens. For example, when the war's ambit expands, the
United States will detain more people and actually conduct proceedings in
military commissions; in turn, these endeavors will generate new litigation,
such as direct challenges to tribunals' validity-phenomena that the
conflict in Iraq demonstrates.
Part III, consequently, proffers
recommendations that urge more nuanced treatment of the relevant
precedent.
I. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS

Dickinson comprehensively explores numerous, unclear features of
the United States' response to the September 11 terrorist attacks. 6 She
emphasizes the realist critique, which states that compliance with the letter
of international law would undermine national and global security interests,
and, therefore, justifies suspending the requirements that normally govern.
She ascertains that the terrorist strikes have raised, once again, how the rule
of law serves the United States as a country and a people, and how legal
process values might facilitate efforts to combat terrorism over the long
term.
The article's first part surveys the arguments that the Bush
Administration's indefinite secret detentions and military commissions
violate the rule of law, first, as a domestic matter, by flouting basic
protections in the United States Constitution, and second, internationally,
by contravening established international law tenets.
Dickinson
specifically assesses how detentions now, and the military tribunals
contemplated would, jeopardize essential constitutional procedures. 7 She
recounts the plethora of ways that commission proceedings would curtail
accused individuals' rights vis-a-vis what the Constitution ordinarily
guarantees for civilian trials, finding that they could "hardly be called a
trial at all" and would afford much less protection "than court-martial trials
6. See Dickinson, supra note I, at 1410-11, 1432-35.
7. See id. at 1412-21; Jonathan Turley, Tribunals and Tribulations: The Antithetical Elements
of Military Governance in a Madisonian Democracy, 70 GEO.WASH. L. REV. 649, 743-48 (2002).
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under the U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice." 8 She contends that these
detentions and tribunals deviate from the scheme that the Constitution
envisioned because unilaterally asserted executive power initiated them
with no express congressional ratification or judicial approval, and she
relies on Ex parte Milligan for Supreme Court recognition that the
document's checks and balances operate during wars and national crises. 9
Thus, the Constitution requires the tripartite branches to share
governmental power, a stricture that the Administration rejects by arguing
that the courts should not review detentions, and by excluding them and
Congress from instituting military tribunals or scrutinizing commission
proceedings-even though the document assigns the legislative, not
executive, branch authority to "define and punish ... Offences against the
Law of Nations[.]" 10 She then asserts that military tribunals that so limit
procedural protections have been created only when Congress has
authorized them or has declared war, and because neither situation
presently exists, Ex parte Quirin furnishes no support. 11
Dickinson next reviews international law arguments, which have
received less emphasis in public discourse, and finds that the Bush
Administration's actions seem to violate major treaties to which the United
States is a signatory and integral features of customary international law.
For instance, the indefinite secret detentions and suggested
military-commission procedures ignore numerous procedural protections in
the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights and may
8. Dickinson, supra note I, at 1415-18 (reviewing the lack of provision for jury trials and for
the privilege against self-incrimination, the potential for the proceedings to be closed, the evidentiary
rules, and the requirements governing proof and verdicts). See also 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (1994)
(Uniform Code of Military Justice); David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 978-85 (2002)
(discussing various military orders and the procedures); supra note 5 (discussing various military
orders).
9. Milligan implicated military commissions. See Dickinson, supra note I, at 1418-21. See
also infra notes 178-81 and accompanying text. See generally Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should
Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1046-48 (2003)
(assessing the constitutionality of military tribunals).
IO. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. IO; Dickinson, supra note I, at 1419 (citation omitted);
Turley, supra note 7, at 750.
11. She emphasizes that the Bush Order purports to extend the scope of military tribunals beyond
that "upheld in Quirin, both to circumstances in which Congress has not declared war or specifically
authorized the commissions and to violations far beyond the laws of war." Dickinson, supra note I, at
1421; Harold Hongju Koh, The Case Against Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 337, 339-40
(2002), available at http://www.jstor.org/.
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contravene the Geneva Conventions. 12 Dickinson admonishes that the
United States' earlier use of military tribunals predated these treaty
obligations and the "modern development of due process standards in
international humanitarian law." 13
Dickinson claims that proponents (especially within the
Administration) of detentions and military commissions couch their
arguments mainly in practical, not legal, terms, finding law an
inconvenience, and even dangerous, while they argue that several reasons
warrant suspending the principles that usually govern adjudication of
criminal responsibility. 14 Because Dickinson concludes that rule-of-law
ideas will not persuade those who articulate realist concerns, the second
part directly addresses these notions by developing arguments about the
value of international legal process, as this will advance near- and
long-term American strategic interests. 15 She draws primarily on President
Franklin D. Roosevelt's Administration's recognition that the
establishment of international war-crimes tribunals would foster the United
States' interests by compiling a historical record, showing American
commitment to legal process and promoting respect for the rule of law
overseas. 16 Dickinson concomitantly finds that the new sociopolitical
circumstances that result from global terrorism make international legal
process more imperative, and she enumerates its benefits.17
12. See Dickinson, supra note I, at 1421-23. See also International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Dec. I 9, I 966, 999 U.N.T.S. I 7 I; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. V, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 141-42. See generally Cole, supra note 8, at
979-80 (stating that the Bill of Rights outlines global concepts of basic human rights).
13. See Dickinson, supra note I, at 1431 (citation omitted). The two most critical examples of
military-tribunal trials took place before the above-referenced treaty obligations and granted much more
procedural protection than the Bush initiative. Thus, she finds little precedent or legal support for the
present initiative. See id. at 1432; Turley, supra note 7, at 719-20.
I 4. These include the amount of time required for civilian trials, expense, risk to judges and
jurors, the needlessness of protecting terrorists' rights, the fact that the evidence available does not
satisfy strict evidentiary rules and much must be kept secret for national security reasons, and
detentions and military tribunals afford needed government control. See Dickinson, supra note I, at
1433-34.
15. See id. at 1435; Turley, supra note 7, at 743-48. See, e.g., Viet D. Dinh, Freedom and
Security After September 11, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 399, 405 (2002); Ruth Wedgwood, Al
Qaeda, Terrorism, and Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 328 (2002), available at
http://www.jstor.org/.
16. See Dickinson, supra note I, at 1437-45. See also GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND
OF VENGEANCE, THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS (2000); TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY
OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS (1992).
17. The benefits include cementing the global coalition that the United States needs to combat
terrorism efficaciously; strengthening intergovernmental endeavors that prevent terrorism in the long
term; fostering terrorists' apprehension, arrest, and trial, and protection of American citizens overseas;
establishing the crime's global nature and isolating Al Qaeda from the rest of the world; facilitating

1376

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:1371

Because some critics assert that international tribunals are impractical
due to problems in creating them and political opposition, Dickinson treats
those ideas. 18 After she concedes that certain international options might
defy smooth implementation, she maintains that expansion of present
international tribunals' jurisdiction could be felicitously achieved. 19 Her
similar admission that establishing an international tribunal may be
politically unacceptable in the United States leads her to offer two
approaches that might be more palatable and retain some benefits of an
international process. 20 These are an internationalized military commission
that could include judges from America and other nations, 21 and a hybrid
domestic/international court that would receive the United Nations'
assistance and be attached to the peacekeeping force in Afghanistan where
it would sit. 22
Dickinson concludes by responding to the law skeptics in a
She
finds
that
the
comparatively
theoretical
manner. 23
international-relations realist critique resembles that of critical legal
theorists who have not completely abandoned legal process or judicial
adjudication, and explores why the critical legal scholars have yet to
jettison these notions. 24 She draws on pathbreaking work by Robert Cover
on adjudicatory processes' import 25 and finds that his ideas lend additional
support to the use of legal process even during politically uncertain times. 26
In sum, Dickinson significantly advances understanding of detentions,
military commissions, and terrorism, mentioning certain applicable
domestic case law throughout. The Bush Administration, however, has
placed undue reliance on specific opinions, particularly Quirin, when
detaining suspects, establishing tribunals, and conducting terrorism
litigation. Moreover, a growing number of courts have agreed with this
development of international norms for terrorism; and increasing the perceived legitimacy of actions by
the United States government. See Dickinson, supra note I, at 1445-66.
18. See id. at 1466-67. Dinh and Wedgwood, supra note 15, apparently hold these views.
19. See Dickinson, supra note I, at 1466-68. For an analysis of international tribunals, see
TAYLOR, supra note 16, at 43-115; Koh, supra note 11, at 342-44.
20. See Dickinson, supra note I, at 1466-68. See generally Turley, supra note 7, at 743-48
(assessing similar approaches).
21. See Dickinson, supra note I, at 1468-72. See also TAYLOR, supra note 16, at 571-611. See
generally R. JOHN PRITCHARD, THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL: THE COMPLETE TRANSCRIPTS ( 1989).
22. See Dickinson, supra note I, at 1472-77.
23. See id. at 1477-90.
24. See id. at 1478.
25. See NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER (Martha Minow
et al. eds., 4th ed. 1995).
26. See Dickinson, supra note I, at 1478-90. See also STUART HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE Is
CONFLICT (2000) (assessing the relationship between conflict and the law).
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emphasis.
These developments necessitate greater consideration of
precisely how the executive and judicial branches have invoked the
precedent, as well as exposition of why that dependence lacks support.
Part II undertakes this effort.
II. ANALYSIS OF DOMESTIC CASE PRECEDENT
A. RELIANCE ON THE PRECEDENT

1. Military Commissions
On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued an Executive Order
that authorized the creation of military tribunals and purportedly denied
federal court access to individuals tried before them. 27 His Administration,
in essence, premised that Order and its ostensible nullification of federal
court jurisdiction on Ex parte Quirin, powers delegated by Article II in the
Constitution, and Congress' September 2001 "Authorization for Use of
Military Force" Joint Resolution. 28 President Bush, cabinet members, and
numerous other high-ranking public officials have variously invoked
Quirin. For example, when the President justified the November Order, he
mentioned Quirin by recounting how Roosevelt had instituted a similar
World War II military commission. He characterized "[n]on-U.S. citizens
who plan and/or commit mass murder [as] unlawful combatants," saying
they could be tried in military commissions if this promoted the "national
security interest."29 On November 14, Vice President Dick Cheney
similarly alluded to Quirin and military-tribunal use since the founding as
the principal justifications for commissions and stated that the U.S. should
try those responsible for the terrorist attacks-those who do not "deserve
the same guarantees" as American citizens "going through the normal
judicial process. " 30
27. See Bush Order, supra note 5, at 57,833.
28. See id.; DOD ORDER, supra note 5, at 1-2, 13-14. See also U.S. CONST. art. 11; S.J. Res. 23,
107th Cong. (2001 ).
29. See Mike Allen, Bush Defends Order for Military Tribunals; President Hosts Ramadan lftar
Dinner, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2001, at Al4 (affording the allusion); Wayne Washington, FDR Move
Cited in Tribunals, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 2, 2001, at A 1 (affording the quotation). President Bush later
justified the creation of tribunals by requesting that Americans remember that those who would be tried
"are killers" who "don't share the same values [that] we share." Exchange with Reporters in
Alexandria, Virginia, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 469 (Mar. 25, 2001 ).
30. Vice President Richard Cheney, Remarks to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Nov. 14,
2001). See also Interview by 60 Minutes II with Vice President Richard Cheney (Nov. 14, 2001). See
generally Michal R. Belknap, A Putrid Pedigree: The Bush Administration's Military Tribunals in
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That day, Attorney General John Ashcroft proffered quite analogous
concepts by invoking tribunals' long tradition and High Court recognition,
most relevantly in Quirin. He stated that commissions are legitimate and
argued that "foreign terrorists who commit war crimes against the United
States ... are not entitled to" our constitutional protections. 31
On
December 6, Ashcroft testified that Quirin approved tribunal use "in the
United States against enemy belligerents," and the Court exercised "habeas
corpus jurisdiction to decide" the validity of tribunals and the issue of
"whether the belligerents were actually eligible for trial under the
commission."32
DOJ Assistant Attorneys General with major
For instance, the
war-on-terrorism duties have relied on Quirin.
then-Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division, Michael
Chertoff, defended the Bush Order by asserting that its terms were
"virtually identical" to those in the Roosevelt Order and Proclamation. He
detailed the venerable history of tribunals and stated that the justices
acknowledged their constitutionality in Quirin. 33 The Assistant Attorney
General for the Office of Legal Policy, Viet Dinh, has invoked the lengthy
pedigree of commissions. He mentioned how Roosevelt had applied the
entities and relied on Quirin to claim that the "Court has unanimously
upheld" their legitimacy. 34
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
substantiated the Bush and DOD Orders by saying tribunals have been used
in wartime since the nation's founding: Roosevelt had employed them and
the "Supreme Court upheld" the entities' validity in Quirin. 35 The DOD
General Counsel, William Haynes II, depended on Quirin to support the
Historical Perspective, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 433, 434 (2002) (criticizing Vice President Cheney's
remarks).
31. Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Attorney General John Ashcroft & lNS
Commissioner Ziglar Announce INS Restructuring Plan (Nov. 14, 2001), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2001/agcrisisremarks11_14.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2003). See
Jonathan Turley, Military Tribunal Rules Put Our Values to Test, SALT. SUN, Mar. 25, 2002, at 7 A.
32. The Attorney General again recounted the venerable history of military commissions. See
Department of Justice Oversight: Preserving Freedoms While Fighting Terrorism: Hearings Before the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 327 (2001) (statement of John Ashcroft, United States
Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= I 07_senate_hearings&docid=f:8 I 998.pdf (last visited Sept. 4, 2003).
33. See id. (statement of Michael Chertoff, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S.
Department of Justice); infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
34. Dinh, supra note 15, at 405-06. See also Eric Lichtblau and Adam Liptak, Threats and
Responses: On Terror, Spying and Guns, Ashcroft Expands Reach, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2003, at Al.
35. Military Commissions: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 107th
Cong. (200 I) (statement of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Department of Defense),
available at http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2001 /011212wolf&rums.pdf (last visited Sept. 4,
2003).
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March 2002 DOD Order, and he contended that federal judges have
affirmed presidents' authority to convene military tribunals. 36
White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales has relied on Quirin for the
notion that the High Court has "consistently upheld" military-commission
use and stated that the phrasing in the Bush Order was derived from the
terms of Roosevelt's Proclamation and Order-phrasing that the Court
interpreted to allow habeas corpus scrutiny. 37 He also claimed that any
"habeas corpus proceeding in a federal court" that questions actions under
the Bush Order (authorizing the use of military tribunals for non-United
States citizens) would be restricted to scrutinizing "the lawfulness of the
commission's jurisdiction." 38
2. Detentions
Influential legal officials have similarly justified indefinite detention
of suspected terrorists. For example, in June 2002, Deputy Attorney
General Larry Thompson argued that Jose Padilla was detained "under the
laws of war as an enemy combatant," citing Quirin as "clear Supreme
Court" authority. 39 DOD's General Counsel also supported detentions by
asserting, "Presidents have detained enemy combatants in every major
conflict in the Nation's history."40
3. War-on-Terrorism Litigation
The DOJ and DOD have relied greatly on Quirin, in part for broad
deference to the executive in national crises, when litigating major
terrorism cases that involve detention. Moreover, the courts depended on
36. "The Fourth Circuit recently confirmed" these propositions in Hamdi. See Press Release,
U.S. Department of Defense, DOD Responds to ABA Enemy Combatant Report (Oct. 2, 2002) (quoting
Letter from William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Department of Defense, to Neal R. Son nett, Chair,
ABA Task Force on Treatment of Enemy Combatants (Sept. 23, 2002)) [hereinafter Haynes Letter],
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct2002/bl0022002_bt497-02.html (last visited Sept. 4,
2003). See generally Jonathan Turley, The Military Pocket Republic, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (2002)
(assessing military tribunals as one aspect of the military pocket republic).
37. See Alberto R. Gonzales, Martial Justice, Full and Fair, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, at A27.
See also Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Youngstown Revisited, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 373,
394-95 n.85 (2002) (assessing the Gonzales article).
38. Gonzales, supra note 37. See also Tom Brune, Military Courts to Vary on Rules, NEWSDAY,
Dec. 1, 2001, at A2 (assessing the Gonzales article). Senators' views that are similar to the
Administration's are in the hearings cited at supra notes 31, 33, 35.
39. Larry Thompson, Paul Wolfowitz & Bob Mueller, U.S. Department of Justice Briefing (June
10, 2002).
40. See Haynes Letter, supra note 36.
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Quirin to resolve Hamdi v. Rumsfeld4 1 and Padilla ex rel. Newman v.
Bush. 42 Most aggressive was the government's claim in one Hamdi appeal
that given their "'constitutionally limited role ... in reviewing military
decisions, courts may not second-guess the military's determination that an
individual is an enemy combatant and should be detained as such. "'43 The
Fourth Circuit criticized this assertion first by recasting it44 and then
denying the motion to dismiss. 45 Despite this rebuke, the court basically
subscribed to the idea when it cited Quirin extensively for notions such as:
"[During] World War II, the Court stated in no uncertain terms that the
President's wartime detention decisions are to be accorded great deference
from the courts."46 Moreover, the Fourth Circuit essentially accepted the
government's view because it relied on Quirin in acquiescing to the
executive, did not scrutinize the justification for detaining Hamdi, and gave
him no access to counsel. 47 The three Hamdi opinions also deemphasized
the vast expansion of habeas corpus and international law since Quirin was
issued. 48
District court treatment of the Padilla litigation resembled Hamdi and
relied on Hamdi's resolution. 49 For example, the trial judge ascertained
that the "logic of Quirin bears strongly on this case" and broadly invoked
the case precedent, which "recognized the distinction between lawful and
unlawful combatants," and further held that "[u]nlawful combatants are
41. This was first brought in the Eastern District of Virginia and has received three Fourth
Circuit opinions. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), reh 'g denied en bane, 337
F.3d 335 (4th Cir. 2003). See also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002); Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d 598 (4th Cir. 2002).
42. This was brought in the Southern District of New York, and the trial judge recently certified
an interlocutory appeal to the Second Circuit. See Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564
(S.D.N.Y. 2002). See also Padilla ex. rel. Newman v. Rumsfeld, 256 F. Supp. 2d 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(certifying an interlocutory appeal).
43. See Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 283.
44. According to the court: "The government thus submits that we may not review at all its
designation of an American citizen as an enemy combatant-that its determinations on this score are the
first and final word." Id.
45. It elaborated: "In dismissing, we ourselves would be summarily embracing a sweeping
proposition-namely that, with no meaningful judicial review, any American citizen alleged to be an
enemy combatant could be detained indefinitely without charges or counsel on the government's
say-so." Id.
46. Id. at 282.
47. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 472-75 (4th Cir. 2003). Hamdi remains in custody.
48. See supra note 41. See also supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text; infra notes 198-205
and accompanying text (discussing the vast expansion of habeas corpus in international law). But see
Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 468-69 (according a narrow reading to international law).
49. See Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 592-93 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); supra
notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
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likewise subject to capture and detention .... "50 Using Quirin, the court
drew an analogy and held that President Bush had the power to detain
unlawful combatants. 51 The judge also said that the High Court suggested
that Roosevelt's "decision to try the saboteurs before a military tribunal
rested at least in part on an exercise of Presidential authority under Article
II," even though it found no need to resolve whether the "President as
Commander in Chief has constitutional power to create military
commissions without the support of Congressional legislation." 52
Moreover, the judge exhibited great deference, articulating the quite lenient
"some evidence" burden of proof that the government must satisfy to
support a presidential finding that a detainee is an unlawful combatant. 53
Furthermore, the court invoked Youngstown for the notion that President
Bush was "acting at maximum authority . . . in the decision to detain
Padilla as an unlawful combatant."54 Finally, Padilla had not yet met with
his lawyer when the judge certified an interlocutory appeal on this issue. 55
B. WHY RELIANCE ON THE PRECEDENT IS MISPLACED
I. Military Commissions
It may seem best to address tersely the Administration's misplaced
reliance on Quirin when it issued the Bush and DOD Orders56 because
50. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 594-95 (citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. I, 30-31 (1942))
(emphasis in Padilla); supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
51. See Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 594-96. If the Supreme Court "regarded detention alone as a
lesser consequence than ... trial by military tribunal-and it approved even that greater consequence,
then our case is a fortiori from Quirin as regards the lawfulness of detention." Id. at 595.
52. Id. See also infra note 167 and accompanying text (providing the Supreme Court's analysis
of this issue in Quirin). See generally Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28-29.
53. See Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 605-10. The court apparently premised this deference on its
limited authority and competence to decide the question and on the president's substantial authority in
this context.
54. See id. at 606-07. See also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-37
(1952); infra notes I 06-17 and accompanying text. But see supra note I0; infra notes 122-25 and
accompanying text.
55. The court did reject the government's claim that Padilla should not have access to counsel.
See Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 564, 599-605. The judge seemed to find the government's
reconsideration motion a dilatory tactic. See Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Rumsfeld, 256 F. Supp. 2d 218
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). One recent terrorism opinion did mention Quirin once at its outset, but the decision
relied primarily on another World War II case. See Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1136,
1138-45 (D.C. Cir. 2003). See also Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 763 (1950) (affording the
World War II case on which the D.C. Circuit relied).
56. See supra notes 27-38 and accompanying text. See also supra note 5 and accompanying
text.
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military tribunals have tried no one57 and a few scholars, including
Dickinson, have assessed their validity. 58 Other ideas require much
scrutiny, however. Commissions will soon try defendants 59 and inexorably
prompt litigation contesting the entities' legitimacy. Thorough analysis
will also improve comprehension of Quirin and its use, Youngstown and
why it is the most relevant precedent, and why Youngstown and the
Constitution bar presidential abolition of federal court jurisdiction, even
though tribunals might be valid in some contexts (e.g., overseas
prosecutions that arise from declared wars).
a. Why Youngstown and the Constitution Are Controlling
Constitutional Text and History. The Constitution's text and history,
as well as case law, show that Congress, not the executive, is the federal
government's political branch that is authorized to prescribe federal court
jurisdiction. Article I states, "Congress shall have Power ... To constitute
Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court,"60 and Article III says, "The
judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish."61 The first Congress created the lower federal courts and
provided for their jurisdiction. 62 Article I also states that Congress is to
"define and punish ... Offences against the Law of Nations." 63 Moreover,
landmark cases, such as Sheldon v. Sill, 64 have held that the "disposal of the
judicial power (except in a few specified instances) belongs to Congress."65
57. The government did publicly acknowledge that it would use tribunals. See Vanessa Blum,
The Outlines of Justice, LEGAL TIMES, May 26, 2003, at I; Neil A. Lewis, Six Detainees Soon May
Face Military Trials, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2003, at A I; Adam Liptak, Tribunals Move from Theory to
Reality, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2003, at Al2.
58. See Dickinson, supra note I. See also Bryant & Tobias, supra note 37, at 424-31. See
generally Cole, supra note 8; Neal K. Katya! & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt:
Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259 (2002); Youngstown at Fifty: A Symposium, 19
CONST. COMMENT. (2002).
59. See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, MILITARY COMMISSION INSTRUCTION Nos. 1-8 (Apr.
30, 2003); Vanessa Blum, DOD Readies Teams for Terror Trials, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 14, 2003, at I;
Neil A. Lewis, Tribunals Nearly Ready for Afghanistan Prisoners, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2003, at 11;
Roland Watson, September 11 Trial Near Collapse, TIMES OF LONDON, Apr. 5, 2003, at 25.
60.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
61.
U.S. CONST. art. III,§ I.
62. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. XX, I Stat. 73 (1789); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION 9-11 (4th ed. 2003); FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE
SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 4-14 (1927).
63.
U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 10. See Dickinson, supra note I, at 1419; supra note IO and
accompanying text.
64. 49 U.S. 441 ( 1850). See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 62, at 192-93.
65. See Sheldon, 49 U.S. at 448 (citation omitted); Bryant & Tobias, supra note 37, at 384-86.
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Post-September 11, 2001 Legal Developments.
Despite the
Constitution's text and history, President Bush issued the November Order.
Section 7(b) provides that military commissions "shall have exclusive
jurisdiction with respect to offenses by" anyone subject to the Bush Order,
and those subject to the Order
shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding,
directly or indirectly, or to have any such remedy or proceeding sought
on the individual's behalf, in (i) any court of tbe United States, or any
State thereof, (ii) any court of any foreign nation, or (iii) any
international tribunai. 66

This expansive wording imposes the proscription on all courts-federal,
state, or international-apart from the military tribunals the Order creates. 67
As to the Bush Order's critical issues, detentions and federal court
jurisdiction stripping, the Administration initially requested Congress'
approval, which lawmakers denied. It then arrogated to itself the power
sought.
On September 19, 2001, President Bush sent Congress proposed
legislation, titled the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 ("ATA"), which
addressed numerous law enforcement, immigration, and counterterrorism
matters. 68 Sections 202 and 203 of the ATA had greatest relevance for the
issues that the Order would later address. Section 202 would have
authorized the Attorney General to detain indefinitely any United States
noncitizen who that official "has reason to believe may commit, further, or
facilitate acts" of terrorism, which was defined quite broadly. 69 Section
203 would have granted District of Columbia federal courts exclusive
authority over federal habeas corpus review of section 202 detentions. 70
66. Bush Order, supra note 5, at 57,835-36.
67. My emphasis here is on jurisdiction stripping. I am not assessing whether the 'Bush Order
can deprive state or international courts or tribunals of power to provide relief. The Supreme Court
sharply limited state-court ability to grant people in federal custody relief in Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 397, 411-12 (1871). See also McClung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. 598, 603-04 (1821) (denying state
courts the power to issue federal officers writs of mandamus); MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 157-64 (2d ed. 1990); CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT& MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 298 (6th ed. 2001).
68. Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001, 107th Cong. (2001) (unintroduced draft house resolution),
available at http:l/www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/ata200l_text.pdf (last visited Sept. 4, 2003)
[hereinafter AT Al; American Values on Trial, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2002, at Bl6.
69. See ATA, supra note 68, § 202. See also Terrorism Investigation and Prosecution: Hearing
Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) [hereinafter Sept. 25 Senate
Judiciary Committee Hearing] (statement of Sen. Specter) (quoting § 202 of the Bush Administration's
draft legislation). See generally Harold Hongju Koh, The Spirit of the Laws, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 23,
34-36 (2002) (assessing the proposed language).
70. ATA, supra note 68, § 203; Winging It at Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2002, at 22.
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Republicans and Democrats in both chambers, 71 as well as interest
groups, 72 strongly opposed these sections. 73 The statute Congress did pass
imposed several major restrictions on the Attorney General's detainment
authority. 74 First, it modified the threshold standard from "reason to
believe" to "reasonable grounds to believe" that the suspect would engage
in or assist terrorist acts. 75 Second, the legislation significantly limited the
officer's power to detain noncitizens suspected of terrorism. 76 Third, the
statute explicitly prescribed federal judicial review through habeas corpus
proceedings of "any action or decision relating to [section 412,] including
judicial review of the merits of' the Attorney General's certification. 77
These restrictions were in the USA PATRIOT ACT ("PATRIOT ACT"),
which President Bush signed on October 26, 2001. 78
Although Congress denied the Attorney General the indefinite
detention power sought, the Bush Order, prescribed eighteen days later,
71. See Sept. 25 Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing, supra note 69 (statement of Sen. Specter);
148 CONG. REC. S742 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy); Jonathan Krim, Anti-Terror
Push Stirs Fears for Liberties; Rights Groups Unite To Seek Safeguards, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2001,
atA17.
72. See No Rush on Rights, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2001, at A34 (editorial); Walter Pincus,
Caution ls Urged on Terrorism Legislation: Measures Reviewed to Protect Liberties, WASH. POST,
Sept. 21, 2001, at A22.
73. For a thorough explanation of this opposition, see Bryant & Tobias, supra note 37, at 38891.
74. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 412(a), 115 Stat. 272, 351
(2001) [hereinafter USA PATRIOT ACT!; Eric Lichtblau, A Nation at War: Liberty and Security;
Republicans Want Terrorism Law Made Permanent, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2003, at BI.
75. John Lancaster, Hill Puts Brakes on Expanding Police Powers, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 200 I,
at A6 (noting that in the "days after September 11, [opinion polls showed] Americans overwhelmingly
favor[ed] stronger police powers, even at the expense of personal freedom"). See also Bryant & Tobias,
supra note 37, at 390 (analyzing the modification of the threshold standard).
76. According to the legislation:
The Attorney General shall place an alien detained under paragraph (I) in removal
proceedings, or shall charge the alien with a criminal offense, not later than 7 days after the
commencement of such detention. If the requirement of the preceding sentence is not
satisfied, the Attorney General shall release the alien.
USA PATRIOT ACT, !07th Cong.§ 412, reprinted in 147 CONG. REC. SI0,547, SI0,622 (daily ed.
Oct. 11, 2001) (emphasis added). Senator Patriek Leahy (D-Vt.) emphasized: "[l]fan alien is found not
to be removable, he must be released from custody." Id. at SI 0,558.
77. 147 CONG. REC. SI0,558, 10,622 (statement of Sen. Leahy). See also id. (subjecting the
Attorney General's certification to judicial review).
78. See supra note 74. The USA PATRIOT ACT also changed the Administration's venue
proposal. See supra note 70. According to the Act, original habeas corpus petitions can be filed in any
U.S. district court with jurisdiction, thereby satisfying the Administration's concerns about inconsistent
authority with the less onerous stricture that all appeals be heard by the D.C. Circuit, whieh would
apply Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit cases as the "rule of decision." USA PATRIOT ACT, supra
note 74, at 352.
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ostensibly granted the Defense Secretary that authority. Section 3
empowers and directs the Secretary to take into custody and "detain[] at an
appropriate location ... outside or within the United States" any
"individual subject to" the directive, 79 whom section 2 defines as any
person "who is not a United States citizen with respect to whom [the
President] determine[s] from time to time in writing that ... there is reason
to believe that such individual" is an international terrorist dangerous to the
United States or is someone who "has knowingly harbored one or more"
such people.so The Bush Order, in fact, claims much greater power than
had been requested, as the most aggressive stance in Congress was that
federal habeas corpus review of detentions should be limited to the District
of Columbia federal courts.s 1 Yet the Bush Order purportedly eliminates
all judicial scrutiny that might be sought by or on behalf of "any individual
subject to [the] order,"s 2 the plain meaning of which the DOD Order later
confirmed by strictly proscribing federal judicial review of any feature of a
proceeding under the Order.s 3 The DOD Order dispels doubt about the
preclusion of judicial scrutiny-even the exercise of habeas corpus
jurisdiction in federal court-in expressly stating that
[a] Commission finding as to a charge and any sentence of a
Commission becomes final when the President or, if designated by the
President, the Secretary of Defense makes a final decision thereon ....
Any sentence made final by action of the President or the Secretary of
Defense shall be carried out promptly. s4
79. See Bush Order, supra note 5, at 57,834.
80. Id. Aceording to the Bush Order, if the President deems that "it is in the interest of the
United States" to subject someone to it, then and only then does it apply. Id. This grants discretion to
not apply the Bush Order, but it is unbridled, so executive power to apply it against anyone deemed an
international terrorist, or one who aids or abets such conduct, is not restrained.
81. See Krim, supra note 71. See also Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The
Constitutional Validity of Military Commissions, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 249, 252-54 (2002) (assessing the
constitutional authority for the Bush Order); Molly McDonough, Tribunals vs. Trials, SS AB.A. J. 20
(Jan. 2002); supra note 7S (showing that Congress rejected the idea that federal habeas corpus review
be limited).
S2. Bush Order, supra note 5, at 57,835-36.
S3. DOD ORDER, supra note 5, at 13-14. See also John Mintz, U.S. Adds Legal Rights in
Tribunals: New Rules Also Allow Leeway on Evidence, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 2002, at Al; Deborah L.
Rhode, Terrorists and Their Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2002, at 27. For an analysis of the Bush
Order's specific provisos, see supra note 5 and accompanying text; Bryant & Tobias, supra note 3 7, at
393; Richard A. Serrano, U.S. Readies Plans for Terror Tribunals Law, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2002, at
Al.
S4. DOD ORDER, supra note 5, § 6(H)(2), at 13; Mintz, supra note S3; Serrano, supra note 83.
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The Bush and DOD Orders thus suggest that the Administration intends to
retain suspected terrorists much longer than the PATRIOT ACT
authorized. 85
Congress, particularly senators, quickly and forcefully responded to
the Bush Order. The Senate Judiciary Committee held several hearings in
which many government officials and constitutional scholars with diverse
political viewpoints testified. 86 Certain persons, namely members of the
Administration, contended that President Bush's authority as
Commander-in-Chief8 7 of the armed forces included the power to issue the
Order, 88 but no witness analyzed whether the President could unilaterally
abrogate federal court jurisdiction. Yet others voiced serious concerns
about the Order's legitimacy because it invaded Congress' province 89 or
violated Bill of Rights guarantees. 90 The hearings and later actions, mainly
85. Given the Bush Order's proscriptions on federal court review, 1 find inadequate White House
counsel's claim that the Bush Order preserves civilian-court review: "lA]nyone arrested, detained or
tried in the United States by a military commission will be able to challenge the lawfulness of the
commission's jurisdiction through a habeas corpus proceeding in a federal court." Gonzales, supra note
37. This otherwise promising concession does not offset the many indications that certification under
the Bush Order precludes federal court review of detention, imprisonment, or imposition of other
punishment, including death. First, Gonzales sharply limited his promise of review in civilian courts to
those "arrested, detained or tried in the United States." Even then, a federal habeas corpus proceeding
would only treat challenges to "lawfulness of a commission's jurisdiction." Id. (emphasis added).
Depending on the Administration's view of "jurisdiction," it may argue that a federal habeas court can
only confirm that the President had found a detainee "subject to" his Order. See Bush Order, supra note
5, at 57,834. Second, Gonzales justified his informal view by citing to Quirin, not the Bush Order's
text, which seems to preclude judicial review. See Gonzales, supra note 37. The Quirin Court reached
the merits, however, only after the DOJ elected "not to contest the Supreme Court's jurisdiction."
Lloyd Cutler, lessons on Tribunals-From 1942, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 2001, at A9. The Bush
Administration might contest jurisdiction, relying on the Bush and DOD Orders' plain terms, and
thereby have the courts treat the constitutional issues avoided in 1942. Even had Gonzales clearly
found that the Bush Order affirmatively protected judicial review through habeas corpus proceedings,
this view may not be the last word. I do not question Gonzales' integrity or good faith, but his opinion
piece fails to bind the Administration in later litigation. His article does not commit President Bush to
the close federal court review to which he should acquiesce.
86. See 147 CONG. REC. Sl3,275-77 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy)
(reviewing the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings related to the Bush Order).
87. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
88. See, e.g., supra note 32, at 325 ("The President has ordered-and it is a Military Order to the
Department of Defense. It is out of his responsibility as Commander-in-Chief of a nation in conflict
that he ordered that the Department of Defense develop a framework that would provide full and fair
proceedings.").
89. See 147 CONG. REC. Sl3,277 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy)
(summarizing the testimony of several legal experts who found that the Bush Order invaded the powers
of Congress), available at http://www.senate.gov/-judiciary/print_testimony.cfm?id= 121&wit_id=72
(last visited Sept. 4, 2003).
90. See, e.g., supra note 32, at 93-110 (testimony of Neal Katyal, Visiting Professor, Yale Law
School) (stating how the Bush Order would violate protections in the Bill of Rights).
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the Administration's lack of solicitude for legislative requests "to review
and be consulted about the draft [DOD] regulations" led Senator Patrick
Leahy (D-Vt.), the Chair of the Judiciary Committee, to act. 91 He
sponsored a February 2002 bill that "would provide the executive branch
with the specific authorization it now lacks to use extraordinary tribunals to
try members of the al Qaeda terrorist network and those who cooperated
with them" 92 because the President does not have power to create the
entities unilaterally. 93 This proposal would restrict detainment and military
trials much more, and accord greater procedural protections than did the
Bush Order. For example, the bill exempts "individuals arrested while
present in the United States, since our civilian court system is well
equipped to handle such cases," 94 and subjects detentions to the supervision
of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit. 95
Thus, President Bush relied on his power as President and
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces to issue the Order (1) requiring
that military tribunals try certain persons who violate the laws of war and
other applicable laws, and (2) depriving these individuals of federal court
access in particular and the judiciary of jurisdiction in general. Senate and
House Republicans and Democrats, however, questioned the Bush Order's
constitutionality, conducted hearings, and introduced proposed legislation
that would curtail the authority President Bush claimed and expressly
preserve federal court review. These indicia of disapproval, together with
Congress' denial of the Administration's requests for the broad power the
Order claims, suggest that the Administration's effort to abolish
jurisdiction contravenes legislative will.
Youngstown.
In reviewing this attempt to abrogate judicial
jurisdiction, one must remember that the constitutional text and history and
91.

148 CONG. REC. S742 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy).

92.

See id.

93. According to Senator Leahy: "The Attorney General testified at our ... December 6
[hearing] that the President does not need the sanction of Congress to convene military commission[s],
but I disagree. Military tribunals may be appropriate under certain circumstances, but only if they are
backed by specific congressional authorization." Id. at S741 (emphasis added).
94. Id. at S742. See also Military Tribunal Authorization Act of2002, S.1941, 107th Cong.§ 3
(2002). On March 20, 2002, House members introduced an identical bill. See H.R. 4035, 107th Cong.
(2002).
95. See Military Tribunal Authorization Act of 2002, S.1941, § S(d). See also 28 U.S.C. § 41
(1994); supra notes 69, 77, 80 and accompanying text. See generally CHRISTOPHER P. BANKS,
JUDICIAL POLITICS IN THE D.C. CIRCUIT COURT (1999); JEFFREY BRANDON MORRIS, CALMLY TO
POISE THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF THE COURTS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
(2001).
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High Court opinions show that Congress has practically total authority to
establish the federal courts and provide for their jurisdiction. President
Harry Truman's 1952 assertion of power to seize steel mills and the
Youngstown decision that held he lacked the authority to do so are the
controlling precedents. The Court assessed presidential issuance of an
executive order that seized the steel mills because he thought an impending
strike by the steelworkers' union would disrupt the Korean War effort. 96
Truman based the order on powers that the Constitution and statutes vested
in him and as President and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.
Justice Hugo Black, writing for the majority, held that Truman did not have
seizure authority. 97 The four justices who joined Black-Felix Frankfurter,
Robert Jackson, William Douglas, and Harold Burton 98-authored separate
opinions, however. 99 Justice Black stated that power, if any existed for
adopting the order, must be in a federal law or the Constitution. 100 He
found neither statutes explicitly authorizing the president to seize private
property nor acts from which this prerogative could fairly be inferred. 101
Justice Black surveyed whether the Constitution granted inherent power to
issue the order and canvassed potential sources from which the authority
might derive. 102 He initially proclaimed that characterizing seizure as an
exercise of Truman's military power as Commander-in-Chief of the armed
forces would not suffice, and described the initiative as a "job for the
Nation's lawmakers, not for its military authorities." 103 Justice Black then
ascertained that the several constitutional provisos that endow the president
with executive power furnished little support, principally because the
See Exec. Order No. I 0,340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3139, 3141 (Apr. I 0, 1952). See generally
supra note 4, at 75-82, 149-77 (assessing the Executive Order).
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588-89 (1952). See generally
H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 189-92 (Alfred A. Knopf 2001) (assessing the
Youngstown Case).
98. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 593 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 634 (Jackson, J.,
concurring); id. at 629 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 655 (Burton, J., concurring).
99. Justice Tom Clark concurred in the judgment but not in the opinion. See id. at 660 (Clark, J.,
96.
MARCUS,
97.
WILLIAM

concurring).
100. Id. at 585. See generally JOHN P. FRANK, MR. JUSTICE BLACK: THE MAN AND HIS OPINIONS
(1949) (affording a contemporaneous analysis of Justice Black); ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK
( 1994) (affording a subsequent analysis of Justice Black).
I 0 I. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585. No law in express terms allowed the chief executive to
use seizure as a tool for addressing labor disputes; indeed, Congress had clearly rejected this approach.
Id. at 585-86.
I 02. The government did not argue that the grant was express. See id. at 587.
I 03. Id. Black found "theater of war" an expanding concept, but he could not conclude that the
executive order was constitutional. See id.
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document's structure and language assign Congress lawmaking authority,
which is not subject to "presidential or military supervision or control." 104
The justices who joined Justice Black might have concurred for
reasons similar to those Justice Frankfurter espoused. 105 The only
concurrence that deserves textual analysis is Justice Jackson's opinion, as
its tripartite scheme for resolving separation-of-powers issues is now a
classic. 106 Justice Jackson opened his framework for evaluating federal
governmental authority by describing it as a rather oversimplified
classification of practical situations in which the president could doubt, or
others might challenge, the official's authority, and by crudely
distinguishing the legal effects created by this relativity factor. 107 The three
categories designate contexts in which executive power is largest, least
substantial, and somewhere between those polar extremes. Jackson
maintained that the president exercises the most authority when proceeding
with Congress' express or implied approval because the power includes all
that the officer has and all that lawmakers delegate. 108 He described the
second category as an intermediate one, where the chief executive proceeds
absent an explicit legislative grant or denial, but where the president can
rely on his or her actual authority alone. There is, however, a "twilight
zone" where the chief executive and Congress might have concurrent
power or the distribution of authority remains unclear. 109 In these
situations, legislative "inertia, indifference or quiescence," as practical
matters, could occasionally allow, and perhaps encourage, independent
presidential efforts, and actual tests of power may reflect the "imperatives
of events and contemporary imponderables," not "abstract theories of
I 04. See id. at 587-88. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ I, 8; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
105. Black's application of separation of powers led Frankfurter to join the majority opinion, but
he found the principle more complex and flexible than it seemed, and stated that varying views might
have suggested different emphases and nuances that one decision could not capture; and thus, individual
articulation was required to reach a common result. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 593 (Frankfurter, J .,
concurring).
106. See Sanford Levinson, The Rhetoric of the Judicial Opinion, in LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE
AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 187, 202-04 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) (praising Jackson's
Youngstown concurrence as the greatest opinion in the Court's history); Bryant & Tobias, supra note
37, at 406-18 (analyzing the concurrences); Katyal & Tribe, supra note 58, at 1274 (characterizing
Jackson's analytical construct as "three now-canonical categories that guide modern analysis of
separation of powers").
107. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring).
I 08. See id. at 635. The president personifies the concept of federal sovereignty, so invalidation
of an action undertaken would mean that the "Federal Government as an undivided whole lacks power."
Id. at 636-37.
109. See id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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law.'' 110 The third grouping includes executive initiatives that conflict with
express or implied legislative will. Presidential authority is at its nadir
because the chief executive can invoke only the official's explicit powers in
the Constitution minus any applicable congressional authority. 111 Justice
Jackson admonished that, here, judges must closely assess executive
assertions and honor exclusive power solely if courts have disabled
legislators from acting on particular matters. 112 When Justice Jackson
applied his three-pronged framework to the seizure, he quickly excluded
the first category, as the government "conceded that no congressional
authorization exists for this seizure," 113 and the second, for lawmakers had
not left seizure an open issue. 114 Thus, the initiative must be sustained
under the third classification's severe restraints, and the justices could
affirm the endeavor only by finding that seizure was within executive
power and beyond Congress' purview. 115 Justice Jackson pledged to read
flexibly the president's enumerated constitutional authority, and he
surveyed the power claimed by reviewing the Executive Article's three
clauses. 116 He concluded, however, that the steel-seizure effort originated
in the president's will and was an "exercise of authority without law." 117
Application of the analytical framework in Youngstown to the Bush
Order suggests that the latter's authorization for indefinite detention and
elimination of federal court review is unconstitutional. 118 The provisions
fail the Youngstown test mainly because they violate recent expressions of
legislative will regarding both matters. 119 The Constitution's text and
110. Id.
111. See id. at 637-38.
112. See id. (citation omitted). A claim so conclusive and preclusive requires scrutiny, as the
constitutional system's equilibrium is at stake. See id. at 638. See also Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co.,
333 U.S. 138, 146-47 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring) (scrutinizing "war power").
113. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 638. This concession would also remove the support of many
declarations and precedents that were proffered in relation to this category "and must be confined[] to
this category." Id. (citation omitted).
114. See id. at 639.
115. See id. at 640.
116. See id. He rejected a "niggardly construction," as some clauses could become nearly
unworkable and immutable by indulging no "latitude of interpretation for changing times." Id.
117. See id. at 655. For later invocation of Youngstown, especially in Dames & Moore v. Regan,
453 U.S. 654 (1981), see Bryant & Tobias, supra note 37, at 420-23.
118. The Black opinion's laconic nature and its numerous, diverse concurrences complicate
precise identification of the holding. See I LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
671-73 (3d ed. 2000); Bryant & Tobias, supra note 37, at 425. See also id. at 425-26 (articulating the
analytical framework in Youngstown).
119. See supra notes 66-95 and accompanying text. Indeed, the congressional developments
since September 11, 200 I are even more powerful than those in Youngstown because they are clearer
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history also show that Congress, not the executive, is the political branch
with the power to prescribe federal court jurisdiction. 120 Accordingly, the
Bush Order's indefinite detention- and jurisdiction-stripping features
invade legislative prerogatives even more than the steel-seizure action.
b. A Word About Quirin
The evaluation above finds that Youngstown is the governing
precedent for constitutional challenges to major provisos of the Bush
Order. That analysis implies that Quirin is not controlling, and, indeed, has
limited relevance, despite great reliance on it by the Administration. The
Administration's dependence is misplaced for reasons in addition to the
determination of unconstitutionality that Articles I and III and Youngstown
compel. The Administration justifies military tribunals partly because they
are modeled on the Roosevelt analogue, the legitimacy of which the Court
sustained in Quirin. These arguments lack force. Earlier commissions that
afforded such drastically cabined procedural protections as the Bush Order
were used only when Congress had expressly approved them or declared
war. 121 Here, lawmakers have instituted neither action. Thus, Quirin has
restricted application. 122
Moreover, the Roosevelt Proclamation was extremely limited to
"sabotage, espionage or other hostile or warlike acts." 123 In sharp contrast,
the Bush Order broadly prescribes offenses that tribunals may try as
including violations of the "laws of war and other applicable laws," 124
thereby extending the entities' scope beyond what Quirin approved. 125 In
1996, Congress also passed the War Crimes Act, which contemplates that
and quite recent. For additional application of the analytical framework in Youngstown, see Bryant &
Tobias, supra note 37, at 425-31.
120. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
121. See Dickinson, supra note 1, at 1420. See also Koh, supra note 11, at 339-40.
122. In 1941, Congress had declared war and had approved tribunals in its Articles of War. See
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30 (1942). See also 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000) (authorizing military
tribunals). But see Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 81, at 254-55 (finding sufficient authority to
support modern tribunals).
123. See Proclamation No. 2561, 7 Fed. Reg. 5101 (July 2, 1942). See also Quirin, 317 U.S. at
22-23.
124. Bush Order, supra note 5, at 57,833.
125. Congress has not declared war or authorized violations exceeding the laws of war. See
Dickinson, supra note 1, at 1421; supra notes 10-11; infra notes 198-205 and accompanying text
(suggesting that Quirin may also be limited because federal habeas corpus, international, and
human-rights law were underdeveloped in 1942).
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persons who commit statutorily defined war crimes will receive civilian
trials. 126
2. Detentions and War-on-Terrorism Litigation
a. Quirin
The executive branch and federal courts cite Quirin to support critical
ideas that it cannot support, such as indefinite detention of United States
citizens and broad judicial deference. Numerous phenomena, including the
extraordinary wartime context, should limit the case's reach. Moreover, its
author, Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, intentionally wrote a restricted
opinion, which some observers claim must be read narrowly.

The Facts of Quirin. The facts warrant much analysis, as they are so
peculiar and deserve a confined reading. 127 After the United States
declared war, Adolph Hitler mandated prompt action against America on
its soil. 128 Germany developed a military- and propaganda-based plan that
first required the destruction of bridges, factories, railroad stations, and
department stores. 129 In spring 1942, experts instructed saboteurs on the
use of detonators, explosives, and related measures at a training camp near
Berlin. 130 Two teams of four saboteurs each then boarded submarines that
deposited one group at a Long Island beach under cover of darkness on
June 13, 1942, and the other in northern Florida on June 17. 131 Both teams'
members landed, dressed wholly or partly in German Marine Infantry
uniforms, and journeyed to major cities in civilian clothes. 132 Two
126. See 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (1996); Dickinson, supra note 1, at 1421. 1 combine below analysis of
misplaced reliance on Quirin to support detentions and to litigate terrorism issues. In several major
terrorism cases reviewed above, the DOJ and DOD placed much reliance on Quirin, while the cases
challenging detentions and the judges deciding them cited Quirin. Some ideas reviewed in this textual
paragraph show why Quirin cannot support broad notions, especially indefinite detention. There has
also been no direct challenge to the Bush Order's constitutionality, for a military tribunal has yet to
convene. I assessed related, relevant issues in treating Youngstown above.
127. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 20-22; FISHER, ~upra note 2, at 1-42; RACHLIS, supra note 2, at 7120; Michal R. Belknap, The Supreme Court Goes to War: The Meaning and Implications of the Nazi
Saboteur Case, 89 MIL. L. REV. 59, 62-63 (1980); David J. Danelski, The Saboteurs' Case, I J. SUP.
CT. HIST. 61, 61-69 (1996).
128. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21. See also Danelski, supra note 127, at 61 (assessing Hitler's
mandate). See generally FISHER, supra note 2, at 4; Cyrus Bernstein, The Saboteur Trial: A Case
History, 11 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 131, 132 (1943) (assessing Germany's actions).
129. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21; Robert E. Cushman, Ex parte Quirin et al-The Nazi Saboteur
Case, 28 CORNELL L.Q. 54, 55 (1942); Danelski, supra note 127, at 61, 63.
130. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21; Danelski, supra note 127, at 63. See generally FISHER, supra
note 2, at 1-23.
131. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21; Cushman, supra note 129, at 54; Danelski, supra note 127, at 63.
132. See supra note 131. See generally FISHER, supra note 2, at 25-32.
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saboteurs concluded that they would be saved by betraying the others,
while one fully confessed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"). 133
On June 27, all the saboteurs were in custody, and FBI Director J. Edgar
Hoover announced their capture. 134
On June 30, Roosevelt informed the Attorney General, Francis Biddle,
that the saboteurs "are just as guilty as it is possible to be," and "offenses
such as these are probably more serious than any offense in criminal law";
relatedly, Roosevelt stated that the "death penalty is called for by usage and
by the extreme gravity of the war aim and the [nation's] very existence,"
and proposed that they "be tried by court martial." 135 Biddle, after
consulting the Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, and the Army Judge
Advocate General, Myron Cramer, urged that a military commission be
convened to try the saboteurs. 136 Roosevelt issued a July 2 Executive
Order creating a military tribunal, appointing the judges, prosecutors, and
defense counsel, and prescribing procedures, as well as review of the trial
record and any judgment or sentence by the comrnission. 137 The Order
departed from Articles of War strictures by authorizing (1) admission of
evidence with probative value for a reasonable person; (2) conviction and
the imposition of a death-penalty sentence on a two-thirds (versus
unanimous) vote; and (3) direct transmittal of the record, judgment, and
sentence to the chief executive for review. 138 The same day, the President
issued a Proclamation, ostensibly closing the federal courts to "persons
who are subjects, citizens or residents of any nation at war with the United
States ... and are charged with committing, or attempting or preparing to
133. See Belknap, supra note 127, at 62; Bernstein, supra note 128, at 136-37; Danelski, supra
note 127, at 64-65.
134. See supra note 133. The Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") issued misleading press
releases that suggested its diligence led to the arrests. This incident began "government control on
information about" the case and its successful use for propaganda purposes. See Danelski, supra note
127, at 64-65. See also Belknap, supra note 127, at 62-63.
135. See Jonathan Turley, 'Quirin' Revisited, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 28, 2002, at Al7.
136. See FISHER, supra note 2, at 48-50. Biddle thought that this approach would be rather
expeditious, making it easier to prove the charge of violating the law of war and impose the death
penalty. See id.; Belknap, supra note 127, at 63-64; Danelski, supra note 127, at 66. He also harbored
secrecy concerns and wished to prevent the public from learning about the ease with which the
saboteurs had landed on American soil and the FBI's inept behavior at the outset of World War II. See
Danelski, supra, at 67. For more analysis of Biddle's concerns, see Belknap, supra, at 67-68; Katya! &
Tribe, supra note 58, at 1280-81.
137. Exec. Order No. 9185, 7 Fed. Reg. 5103 (July 2, 1942); Danelski, supra note 127, at 67.
138. Exec. Order No. 9185, supra note 137. See Danelski, supra note 127, at 67. Biddle told
Roosevelt that the deviations "should save a considerable amount of time'.' but would also facilitate the
saboteurs' conviction and imposition of the death penalty. See Danelski, supra, at 67.
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commit sabotage, espionage ... or violations of the law of war." 139 On
July 3, Cramer filed charges with the military commission, stating that the
eight saboteurs had violated the laws of war; Article 81 of the Articles of
War, which involved relieving the enemy; Article 82, which implicated
spying; and conspiracy to commit these offenses. 14 Five days later, the
tribunal commenced the secret trial in a DOJ assembly room, and it
continued for three weeks. 141 The saboteurs' counsel, Army Colonels
Cassius Dowell and Kenneth Royall, believed that the Order and
Proclamation lacked validity, and informed Roosevelt that they would seek
habeas review, prompting his enraged response: "I won't hand them over to
any United States marshal armed with a writ of habeas corpus." 142

°

ln late July, Biddle and Royall convinced the Supreme Court to hear
the case, and Stone convened a special session. 143 The Court heard oral
arguments over eight hours on July 29 and 30. 144 Before the initial
argument, all the justices, except Douglas (who was en route), met in
conference for a preliminary discussion, and Justice Owen Roberts stated
that Biddle thought Roosevelt would execute the saboteurs regardless of
the appeals' disposition. 145 The Court quickly decided the case, assembling
less than a day after arguments to issue a terse per curiam order. Stone
recounted the litigation's history and said that the justices would announce
their disposition and later file a full opinion that explained their
reasoning. 146 The order found that Roosevelt had constitutional power to
create a military tribunal and try the saboteurs, who had "not shown cause
for being discharged by writ of habeas corpus. " 147
139. See Proclamation No. 2561, supra note 123. See also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 22-23
(1942). See generally FISHER, supra note 2, at 50-53.
140. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 23; Bernstein, supra note 128, at 142-43; Danelski, supra note 127,
at67.
141. The government stated that the commission was conducting the trial in secret for security
reasons. See Belknap, supra note 127, at 66; Espionage: 7 Generals v. 8 Saboteurs, TIME, July 20,
1942, at 15.
142. See FRANCIS BIDDLE, lN BRIEF AUTHORITY 331 (1962); FISHER, supra note 2, at 56-59, 6566; Danelski, supra note 127, at 68.
143. See FISHER, supra note 2, at 67-68; RACHLIS, supra note 2, at 188-89, 192, 243-46. The
procedural history in the lower federal courts appears in Quirin, 317 U.S. at 19-20.
144. See Belknap, supra note 127, at 75. For a summary of the arguments proffered by the United
States and by the petitioners, see id. at 70-75; Danelski, supra note 127, at 68-69, 70-71. See
generally FISHER, supra note 2, at 89-108.
145. See Danelski, supra note 127, at 69.
146. See id. at 71. See also Belknap, supra note 127, at 76.
147. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 19; RACHLIS, supra note 2, at 212-13. The Court thus dismissed the
petitioners' applications for habeas writs and affirmed the district court. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 18-19.
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The commission, which had recessed while the saboteurs appealed,
promptly resumed. 148 On August 1, it heard closing arguments, and two
days later, found all defendants guilty and recommended death sentences.
The tribunal submitted the record directly to Roosevelt, who accepted most
of the suggestions. 149 On August 6, the United States electrocuted six of
the petitioners. 150 The President then sealed the case record for the
remainder of the war. 151
Stone agonized over the draft full op1mon for two months. 152 On
September 25, he circulated it and a memorandum, intimating that certain
issues defense counsel raised in July had not been before the Court, yet
urging that they be decided against the saboteurs. 153 For several weeks,
Stone negotiated changes that would satisfy a few justices' concerns. 154
Stone then focused on the Articles of War provisos, over which the Court
was evenly divided and regarding which he had written two drafts. 155
Justice Frankfurter unsuccessfully pursued support for the second. 156 On
October 16, however, Justice Jackson circulated a memorandum that
resembled a concurrence which troubled other members who had earlier
agreed that unanimity was critical. 157 He believed the Court exceeded its
powers "in reviewing the legality of the President's Order and that
experience shows the judicial system unfitted to deal with matters in which
we must present a united front to a foreign foe." 158 That action jeopardized
unanimity and led Justice Frankfurter to pen his Soliloquy. 159 This
148. See RACHLIS, supra note 2, at 209, 212-13; Danelski, supra note 127, at 71.
149. The record was nearly 3000 pages. FISHER, supra note 2, at 181. President Roosevelt did
commute the sentences proposed for the two saboteurs who defected. See Belknap, supra note 127, at
77; Danelski, supra note 127, at 72.
150. See Danelski, supra note 127, at 77. Roosevelt reportedly hoped that the military
commission would recommend death by hanging. See WILLIAM 0. HASSETf, OFF THE RECORD WITH
F.D.R. 1942-1945, at 90, 97, 99 (1958).
151. See Bernstein, supra note 128, at 188-89; Danelski, supra note 127, at 72.
152. See Danelski, supra note 127, at 72-75. Stone posited an intuitive rationale for a decision,
but his law clerks found "little authority" for this, and Stone could only cite analogous cases at
numerous crucial points. See id. at 72.
153. Stone expressed concern about the Court being "in the unenviable position of having stood
by and allowed six men to go to their death without making it plain to all concerned-including the
President-that it had left undecided a question on which counsel strongly relied to secure petitioners'
liberty." Belknap, supra note 127, at 78.
154. See Danelski, supra note 127, at 75-76.
155. See id. at76-77.
156. Option two stated that the Articles of War did not bind the chief executive. See id. at 76.
157. They were Justices Stone, Frankfurter, and Black. See id.
158. See Belknap, supra note 127, at 79.
159. The document has attained considerable notoriety.
See Memorandum from Felix
Frankfurter, F.F.'s Soliloquy, to the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court (Oct. 23, 1942), reprinted in 5
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imaginary exchange criticized the dead saboteurs for appealing and for
igniting a divisive three-branch fight. 160 Once Justice Jackson read the
missive, he decided against a concurrence, 161 and Justice Roberts urged
compromise. 162 Stone continued "patient negotiations" 163 and announced
the Court's decision on October 29, 1942. 164

Analysis of the Quirin Opinion. The Court intentionally resolved the
case on the narrowest grounds, stating as much expressly, and declined to
treat many factual and legal questions. For example, Stone neither
thoroughly scrutinized the claims against, and defenses proffered by, the
saboteurs nor the processes that tested them. This review derived, in
essence, from an agreement that rigorous scrutiny exceeded the Court's
capacity, given the time constraints. The relevant facts were actually
stipulated and undisputed, 165 and Stone did not address petitioners' "guilt
or innocence." 166 The justices also left undecided some legal questions,
such as whether Roosevelt could create the tribunal and whether Congress
could limit the president's authority to treat enemy belligerents, mainly
because Congress had "authorized trial of offenses against the law of war
before such commissions." 167
The Court first assessed the government's contention that Roosevelt's
Proclamation prevented the saboteurs from seeking federal court review
because they were "enemy aliens" who had engaged in the behavior
recounted above. 168 Notwithstanding the document's specific words,
which purported to eliminate judicial scrutiny, the justices reviewed the
petitioners' habeas writs. 169 Stone admonished that federal courts could
GREEN BAG 2D 438, 438 (2002) [hereinafter F.F.'s Soliloquy). See also G. Edward White, Felix
Frankfurter's "Soliloquy" in Ex pa rte Quirin, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 423, 432-36 (2002).
160. See F.F.'s Soliloquy, supra note 159, at 439. See also Danelski, supra note 127, at 77-78.
The imaginary exchange also beseeched the Court through a patriotic plea against creating an ethereal
constitutional debate when America was at total war. See id.
161. See Danelski, supra note 127, at 78. See generally EDWARDS. CORWIN, TOTAL WAR AND
THE CONSTITUTION (1947) (discussing the concept of "Total War" to which Justices Frankfurter and
Jackson alluded).
162. See Danelski, supra note 127, at 78.
163. See id.
164. He ultimately secured a resolution in which his colleagues agreed to disagree about the
rationale. See id. at 78-79. See also Ex pa rte Quirin, 317 U.S. I, I, 18 (1942); infra notes 184-87.
165. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 20; supra notes 128-35 and accompanying text.
166. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25. For example, the Supreme Court did not resolve the question of
whether one of the saboteurs had actually.lost his United States citizenship. See id. at 37-38.
167. Id. at29,47.
168. Id. at 24-25; supra notes 128-35 and accompanying text.
169. According to the Court: "LT)here is certainly nothing in the Proclamation to preclude access
to the courts for determining its applicability to the particular case." Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25. See In re
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overturn petitioners' trial and detention-which the President had ordered
by exercising Commander-in-Chief authority in wartime-only if clearly
convinced that the Constitution or statutes were violated. 170 The Court
canvassed Article I and II powers to provide for the common defense and
found that the president has broad authority to wage war declared by
Congress and to effectuate all statutes that prescribe war's conduct, as well
as define and punish "offenses against the law of nations." 171 Stone then
asked "whether any of the acts charged [were] an offense against the law of
war cognizable before a military tribunal, and if so whether the
Constitution prohibits the trial[,]" and he ascertained that "[b]y universal
agreement and practice, the law of war" distinguishes lawful and unlawful
combatants: "[The former] are subject to capture and detention as prisoners
of war by opposing military forces." 172 Unlawful combatants, such as the
enemy who without uniform comes secretly across military lines to wage
war by destroying life or property, are "offenders against the law of war
subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals." 173 The justices so
classified the saboteurs, finding the initial allegation's first specification
adequate to "charge all the petitioners with the offense of unlawful
belligerency, trial of which" was within the commission's jurisdiction. 174
The Court said that they were not "any the less belligerents" because some
were United States citizens or had not "actually committed or attempted to
commit any act of depredation," or entered an area of active military
operations. 175
Stone next assessed the merits of petitioners' substantive claims that
they were entitled to "presentment or indictment of a grand jury" by the
Fifth Amendment and to a civil court jury trial by Article III and the Sixth
Amendment. 176 "[L]ong-continued and consistent interpretation" meant
the provisos did not "extend[] the right to demand a jury to trials by
military commission, or ... require[] that offenses against the law of war
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 9 (1946) (stating that "Congress ... has not withdrawn [jurisdiction], and the
Executive" could not unless habeas corpus were suspended).
170. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25.
171. Id. at 25-29. The Court's survey of the Articles of War found that Congress had expressly
accorded military tribunals "jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against the law of war in
appropriate cases." Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28. See TRIBE, supra note 118, at 670; supra note 10 and
accompanying text.
172. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 29-31.
173. Id. at 31 (citation omitted).
174. Id. at 36.
175. Id. at 37-38. According to the Court: "The offense was complete when" each person who
was an enemy belligerent passed or went behind American "military and naval lines and defenses
[wearing] civilian dress and with hostile purposes." Id. at 38. See TRIBE, supra note 118, at 300 n.185.
176. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 38-45.
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not triable by jury at common law be tried only in the civil courts." 177 The
Court assumed that some of those offenses are "constitutionally triable only
by a jury," 178 a view it had articulated in Ex parte Milligan. 179 Petitioners
argued that Milligan held that the law of war "can never be applied to
citizens in states which have upheld the authority of the government, and
where the courts are open and their process unobstructed." 180 Because
Milligan "was not an enemy belligerent," Stone distinguished this opinion,
apparently restricting Milligan to its facts and finding the decision
inapplicable to the present case. 181
The Court did not meticulously designate the ultimate scope of the
tribunal's jurisdiction because the saboteurs, "upon the conceded facts,
were plainly within those boundaries .... " 182 Thus, the justices held only
that the behavior at issue was an "offense against the law of war which the
Constitution authorized to be tried by military commission." 183 The Court
was "unanimous in its conclusion that the Articles in question could not at
any stage of the proceedings afford any basis for issuing the writ," 184 but
lacked a majority who agreed on the "appropriate grounds for decision." 185
Certain justices thought that "Congress did not intend the Articles of War
to govern a Presidential military commission convened for [resolving]
questions relating to admitted enemy invaders," 186 even as others believed
that specific Articles covered this tribunal but did not preclude the
measures Roosevelt prescribed or used. 187
My analysis shows many factors that warrant limiting Quirin. For
example, the case evinces the speed with which the government proceeded
and the Court ratified the commission's deliberations, and the difficulties of
rationalizing the full opinion once the United States had used a hastily
written, laconic per curiam order to execute six petitioners. 188 Stone
177. Id. at 40. See generally TRIBE, supra note 118, at 299-300 (assessing Quirin and Milligan).
178. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 29.
179. For an assessment of Quirin and Milligan, see REHNQUIST, supra note 97, at 75-77; Katya!
& Tribe, supra note 58, at 1292.
180. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 121 (1866). See also Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45.
181. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45-46. See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER
& DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 40815 (5th ed. 2003) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER]; Belknap, supra note 127, at 85; Katya! & Tribe,
supra note 58, at 1277-87.
182. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45-46 (emphasis added).
183. See id. at 46.
184. See id. at 47.
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. See id.
188. See id. at 18.
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described his justificatory effort as a "mortification of the flesh," 189 and the
Court differed on the result's reasoning. 190 Quirin manifests the wartime
setting when, for instance, national security interests have eroded, and often
trumped, civil liberties. 191 The opinion also reflects improper exogenous
pressures, most critically from Roosevelt, to legitimate rapid trial, prompt
conviction, and grave punishment; 192 it reflects internal ones, too, mainly
from Justice Frankfurter, 193 who later admitted that Quirin was "not a
happy precedent." 194 Twenty years after the case was issued, Justice
Douglas bemoaned the experience, stating that it showed "all of us that it is
extremely undesirable to announce a decision on the merits without an
opinion accompanying it.
Because once [we] search for the
grounds ... sometimes those grounds crumble." 195 Moreover, the decision
was exceptional and should be restricted to its unusual facts because the
Court expressly stated that its holding was very narrow. 196 Many observers
have suggested that Quirin be sharply confined, and a few have analogized
the opinion to Korematsu v. United States, the discredited ruling that
allowed the internment of Japanese Americans. 197
b. Other Reasons for Limiting Quirin
There are additional, major ways in which Quirin is limited,
essentially warranting the opinion's relegation to an anachronistic period
piece, or at most, an antiquated World War II relic. It is important to
understand that the 1942 timeframe when the Supreme Court resolved
Quirin substantially predated the dramatic expansion of federal habeas
corpus jurisprudence, as well as international law and international
human-rights law.
189. ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 659 (1956);
Danelski, supra note 127, at 72.
190. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
191. See REHNQUIST, supra note 97, at 75; TRIBE, supra note 118, at 670; Earl Warren, The Bill of
Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 191-93 (1962). Justice Jackson even said that the
Court had exceeded its authority. See Belknap, supra note 127, at 79.
192. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 2, at 50-53; Katya! & Tribe, supra note 58, at 1291; supra notes
135-39.
193. Most notable was F.F.'s Soliloquy, supra note 159; see supra note 159.
194. Dane Iski, supra note 127, at 80; White, supra note 159, at 436.
195. Danelski, supra note 127, at 80.
196. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. I, 45--46 (1942); supra notes 166-67, 182-83 and
accompanying text. For similar articulations of the precept that the Court should narrowly draft
opinions, see Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 660-61 (1981), and Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952).
197. See Katya! & Tribe, supra note 58, at 1290-91; Turley, supra note 135. See also Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944); Warren, supra note 191, at 193 n.33.
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Habeas Corpus. Close analysis of Quirin and its historical setting
belies the Administration's repeated contention that the justices only
scrutinized whether the military tribunal's jurisdiction was lawful. 198 The
Court framed the issues vis-a-vis the commission's jurisdiction over the
saboteurs and the alleged offenses, but it resolved on the merits petitioners'
substantive claims that tribunal procedures violated their Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights and the Articles of War. Moreover, the litigants' broad
factual stipulation vitiated any need for judicial inquiry into those facts or
their proof. 199 Even if the Quirin Court merely addressed the issue of
jurisdiction, in the narrowest sense, 200 the opinion could not substantiate
the analogous confinement of federal judicial review, which scrutinizes
detention or punishment under the Bush Order. Assuming that Quirin
required circumscribed review, this feature must be modernized to reflect
the substantial evolution of federal habeas corpus jurisprudence since 1942.
The law that governed the scope of federal habeas corpus scrutiny the
year Quirin was issued narrowly cabined review. 201 Federal courts, in
habeas proceedings at that time and from the nation's origins, essentially
undertook a "jurisdictional inquiry," which meant conviction by a court
with valid jurisdiction ended the matter. 202 Only a decade after Quirin,
when the justices decided cases such as Brown v. Allen, 203 did the Court
l 98. See supra notes 165-97 and accompanying text.
199. See, e.g., Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 607 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(observing that the precedential significance of Quirin is limited by the parties' factual stipulation).
200. I recognize that the Court did not scrutinize the substantive claims against, and defenses of,
the petitioners or the procedures used to test them, mainly because the parties agreed that such review
was beyond the Court's capacity, given the case's temporal context. See supra notes 165-66 and
accompanying text.
201. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 181, at 1364-68 (assessing the debate over the writ's
scope). Leading and often conflicting commentaries on this history include WILLIAM F. DUKER, A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS (1980); ERIC M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS:
RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY (2001); Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal law and
Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 ( 1963); James S. Liebman,
Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 COLUM.
L. REV. 1997 (1992); Lewis Mayers, The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867: The Supreme Court As Legal
Historian, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 31 (1965); Dallin H. Oaks, Legal History in the High Court: Habeas
Corpus, 64 MICH. L. REV. 451 (1966); Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation,
16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579 (1982); Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REV.
575 (1993).
202. Leading cases that articulate the "jurisdictional rule" in Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.)
193 (1830), include Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465-67 (1938), Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86,
91-92 (1923), and Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 375 (1879).
203. 344 U.S. 443 (1953). See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 62, at 922; Eric M. Freedman, Brown
v. Allen: The Habeas Corpus Revolution That Wasn't, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1541 (2000) (affording a
comprehensive assessment of Brown v. Allen). Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. IOI (1942), may have
departed from Watkins. Later precedent and contemporaneous commentary suggest otherwise,
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abandon this sharply restricted habeas corpus jurisprudence and embark on
its dramatic expansion. Now, the writ is generally available to remedy
constitutional mistakes that infect convictions. 204
International Law. The second principal way that Quirin is limited
concerns the remarkably underdeveloped condition of international law and
human-rights law when the determination was issued. 205 For instance, the
World War II ruling predates the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the Geneva Conventions (treaties to which the United
States is a party), as well as long-established tenets of customary
international law that involve due process standards.

In sum, members of the Bush Administration and the federal judiciary
have misplaced reliance on certain domestic case law, especially Quirin.
Part III, therefore, proffers numerous suggestions to address the issues that
terrorism litigation will raise, in part, by urging that executive- and
judicial-branch officials accord relevant precedent the type of nuanced
treatment expressly and implicitly mentioned above.
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
A. MILITARY COMMISSIONS

When the Bush Administration decides to prosecute someone in a
military tribunal, and that individual challenges the tribunal's
constitutionality, the federal judge who entertains this dispute should
resolve the matter pursuant to numerous critical principles.
Most
important, the president does not have authority to eliminate federal court
jurisdiction, a determination compelled by the Constitution and
Youngstown. Military commissions, however, may be valid in particular
contexts (e.g., extraterritorial prosecutions that result from declared wars).
Articles I and III of the Constitution, in clear terms, provide that Congress,
not the executive, is the political branch with power to establish federal
courts and prescribe their jurisdiction. Youngstown is the controlling
precedent. According to the majority opinion, the chief executive lacks
authority to legislate in areas specifically delegated to Congress, even in
national emergencies, and the major concurrence finds this power at its
however. See Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 177 (1947); Alexander Holtzoff, Collateral Review of
Convictions in Federal Courts, 25 B.U. L. REV. 26, 40-46 (1945).
204. A classic example is Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 398-99 (1963). See also CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 62, at 906-07.
205. See Dickinson, supra note I, at 1421-32; supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
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nadir when invoked absent an explicit grant and against clearly stated
legislative will.
Ex parte Quirin correspondingly warrants quite restricted application.
The Court, in express terms, did not resolve whether the president acting
alone could create military tribunals, but premised its decision-holding
that the Roosevelt commission was valid-substantially on Congress' war
declaration and its specific authorization for tribunals in the Articles of
War. Many other phenomena, including the case's peculiar facts, its
narrow holding, and the wartime context, require sharply limiting Quirin.
In short, the Constitution and Youngstown dictate the conclusion that the
chief executive lacks power to nullify federal jurisdiction or to deny
individuals accused of terrorism federal court access.
B. WAR-ON-TERRORISM LITIGATION AND DETENTION

When federal judges address war-on-terrorism litigation, they should
resolve these cases pursuant to several important tenets. Most significant,
courts should recognize that the Bush Administration and a few judges
have invoked Quirin for propositions (such as broad judicial deference to
executive-branch detention decisions) that the opinion cannot support, and
courts must cabin its application for numerous reasons. First, Quirin
involved unique facts that were virtually all uncontested. Second, a
number of phenomena make the opinion and its legal analysis vulnerable to
criticism. 206 Moreover, Stone intentionally and expressly limited the
decision and its holding, and the justices could not agree on a rationale.
Courts should also reject expansive invocation of Quirin for notions like
judicial acquiescence to presidential detention decisionmaking. They must
realize that the Court did exercise jurisdiction, despite the Roosevelt
Proclamation that purportedly barred it, and the justices resolved on the
merits petitioners' substantive claims under the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments and the Articles of War.
Quirin also deserves narrow application because the decision's 1942
issuance substantially preceded burgeoning growth in federal habeas
corpus law. Federal judges must appreciate that the writ's expansion by the
Supreme Court has modified Quirin, and they should clearly reject this
obsolete feature of the opinion when addressing the federal habeas petitions
the Bush Order will engender. Federal habeas corpus law's character and
significance have been dramatically expanded over the last sixty years, and
206.

See, e.g., supra notes 188-97 and accompanying text.
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that development included broadened interpretation of federal
constitutional protections accorded criminal defendants under the Warren
Court. Illustrative of contemporary use of federal habeas corpus law are
allegations that state-appointed counsel furnished ineffective assistance207
and that police secured self-incriminating statements in violation of the
requirements imposed by Miranda v. Arizona. 208
These examples of the writ's modern application do not necessarily
suggest that a defendant whom a military tribunal lawfully tries will have
those or other constitutional protections. A federal court that exercises
jurisdiction over a habeas petition of someone tried in a commission,
however, does possess the requisite authority for deciding on the merits
constitutional challenges to tribunal operation and must not be deterred by
an outmoded allusion to Quirin. Thus, a party might claim that admission
of questionable evidence contravened the individual's Fifth Amendment
right to "due process of law,"209 or that the person's conviction lacked
support in constitutionally adequate evidence210 or was premised on
self-incriminating statements procured in a coercive manner. 211 The lenient
evidentiary criteria that the DOD Order provides mean that litigants
promise to raise these issues. 212 Defendants will pursue many additional
questions. Federal judges facing the issues in the context of a habeas
corpus petition otherwise within their statutory jurisdiction should resolve
them and must not be stymied by anachronistic references to Quirin.
In short, Quirin prescribes meaningful federal court review to the
maximum degree allowed by relevant habeas corpus law, and judiciously
admonishes against unwarranted third branch intrusion in executive
national security actions. Despite the justices' lucid recognition of the
critical wartime situation in which they ruled, the Court resolved
constitutional challenges to the presidential initiative consistent with its
judicial role.
207. See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 367 (2000); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S.
365, 382-83 ( 1986).
208. See Winthrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 682-83 (1993); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
468-7 4 (1966).
209. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The defendant might specifically claim that the evidence was
inherently unreliable or that there was no meaningful opportunity for cross examination. The
Administration's reliance on ex parte affidavits in Hamdi and Padilla may presage their use in
commissions. See Cole, supra note 8, at 977.
210. See Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225, 228-29 (1999).
211. See Winthrow, 507 U.S. at 682-84.
212. DOD ORDER, supra note 5, § 6(D)(l), at 9. See supra note 11 and accompanying text
(suggesting that Quirin narrowly applies today because Congress declared war and expressly authorized
military tribunals).
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Another reason for federal judges to accord Quirin narrow treatment is
that the opinion's 1942 publication predated the great expansion in
international and human-rights law over the ensuing six decades. 213 For
example, judges should enforce, when applicable, the obligations imposed
by international treaties to which the United States is a party. Courts could
also invoke the due process strictures that have evolved in international
humanitarian law since 1942.
The war-on-terrorism litigation thus far provides concrete examples of
these ideas. For instance, even the Fourth Circuit, which has most broadly
read Quirin, seemed to denigrate the government's argument that "courts
may not second-guess the military's determination that an individual is an
enemy combatant and should be detained" because judges have a
"constitutionally limited role. " 214 The appellate court initially restated the
ideas by observing that the United States "submits that we may not review
at all its designation of an American citizen as an enemy combatant-that
its determinations on this score are the first and final word," 215 and then
rejected the government's motion: "In dismissing, we ourselves would be
summarily embracing a sweeping proposition-namely that, with no
meaningful judicial review, any American citizen alleged to be an enemy
combatant could be detained indefinitely without charges or counsel on the
government's say so." 216 District Judge Robert Doumar, who first resolved
the Hamdi case, essentially cabined Quirin and apparently rejected all
resort to it by the government. For example, "before the government had
time to respond to the petition, the district court appointed Public Defender
Frank Dunham counsel for the detainee and ordered the government to
allow the Defender unmonitored access," 217 "intimated that the government
was possibly hiding disadvantageous information from the court," and
"ordered the government to turn over" a significant amount of material it
had gathered on Hamdi. 218 Judge Doumar actually used Quirin as a foil
against the United States. 219 Moreover, District Judge Michael Mukasey,
213. See supra notes 12-13, 205 and accompanying text. But see supra notes48-49.
214. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting the Government's brief).
215. Id.
216. Id. Contra supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
217. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 460, 462 (4th Cir. 2003).
218. Id. The latter two events occurred during an August 2002 hearing. To be sure, the Fourth
Circuit rejected these actions. See id. at 476.
219. Judge Dou mar asked "what, if any, constitutional protections Hamdi was entitled to," and the
government's lawyer "responded that the Constitution applied to the same extent as it did to the
individual who was alleged to be an American citizen in the Quirin case." See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243
F. Supp. 2d 527, 532 (E.D. Va. 2002). "Upon further questioning," the attorney conceded that this
person "was afforded access to counsel and the opportunity to defend himself before a military
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who decided Padilla, recognized that Quirin offered "no guidance
regarding the standard to be applied in making the threshold determination
that a habeas corpus petitioner is an unlawful combatant [b]ecause the facts
in Quirin were stipulated." 220

C.

ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE

Several phenomena frustrate efforts to afford very particularized,
affirmative guidance for federal judges who will confront and must resolve
the myriad issues future war-on-terrorism litigation will generate. 221
Notwithstanding these complications, it is possible to formulate a number
of recommendations principally by extracting ideas from the ways in which
federal courts have addressed terrorism cases and by speculating about
future litigation.
For instance, the judiciary might defer less to, and scrutinize more
carefully, governmental designations of individuals as enemy combatants
because that classification has such profound consequences. Judge
Doumar' s treatment in Hamdi is illustrative. The trial court "asserted that
it was 'challenging everything in the Mobbs' declaration' and that it
intended to 'pick it apart' 'piece by piece[,]"' "repeatedly referred to
information it felt was missing," filed an opinion finding that the
declaration fell "far short of supporting Hamdi's detention," and ordered
the United States to provide information it had collected about the
detainee. 222 A concomitant of this approach would be imposing a review
standard for these governmental designations that is comparatively
rigorous, one that is at least stricter than the quite low "some evidence"
criterion articulated and employed in Padilla. 223
tribunal"; Doumar, however, found it apparent that Quirin received a "significantly broader measure of
due process than Hamdi has received thus far," in part by being confined to the Norfolk Naval Brig
without counsel. Id. at 532-33.
220. See Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 607 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). See also Ex
parte Quirin, 317 U.S. I, 19 (1942).
221. First, one cannot predict what issues will arise, so guidance must necessarily be general.
Second, experts more knowledgeable than I can better forecast the issues. Third, some guidance would
be the opposite of the earlier admonitions about misplaced reliance, such as applying Quirin less
broadly, and, thus, are obvious or redundant.
222. See Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 462. To be sure, the Fourth Circuit rejected this approach. It had
earlier articulated a less deferential view, but ultimately applied such minimalist scrutiny as to
constitute "no meaningful judicial review." See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 2002);
supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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At a higher level of generality, judges may want to protect with
greater vigor individuals' constitutional rights, or at least strike a balance
that is calibrated somewhat more toward the civil liberties (versus national
security) end of the spectrum. For example, courts might provide detainees
access to counsel and impose conditions as warranted, following an
approach similar to that charted by the district judge who decided
Padilla. 224 In this context and others, the bench may wish to reach the
merits of substantive claims under the Constitution, particularly the Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. 225 Several additional war-on-terrorism cases
illuminate the type of balance that judges might consider. For instance, the
Sixth Circuit recognized that the First Amendment "confers a public right
of access to deportation hearings." 226 District Judge Gladys Kessler
similarly found that the Freedom of Information Act required the
government to "release the identities of all individuals detained [in its]
September 11 investigation," with certain limited exceptions. 227 District
Judge Shira Scheindlin issued several opinions that implicated detainee,
Osama Awadallah. The most important one held that the "material witness
statute" did not authorize his detention for a grand jury investigation, and
its violation required suppression of defendant's grand jury testimony. 228
CONCLUSION
Laura Dickinson significantly enhances understanding of detentions
and military tribunals while championing international tribunals. The
realpolitik that Dickinson criticizes, however, now seems ascendant, even
if misguided, as witnessed most recently in the Iraqi conflict. The present
milieu necessitates scrutiny of domestic case precedent and its appropriate
invocation and use. My response attempts to show that the Bush
Administration and several judges have invoked opinions, such as Quirin,
224. See Padilla, 233 F. Supp. at 599-605; supra note 55 and accompanying text. This seems
preferable to allowing detainees, such as Hamdi, to languish in military prisons pending the conflict's
end.
225. The Padilla court expressly did not premise access to counsel on the Sixth Amendment. See
233 F. Supp. 2d at 599-605.
226. See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 682-83 (6th Cir. 2002). But see North
Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d I98, 20 I (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2215 (2003).
227. See Ctr. for Nat'I Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94. I 00 (D.D.C.
2002). A three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit reversed and deferred substantially to the "executive's
judgment in prosecuting the national response to terrorism," citing the Hamdi and North Jersey Media
Group cases. See Ctr. for Nat'! Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
Judge David Tatel authored a vociferous dissent. See id. at 937. See also 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-52 ( 1994).
228. See United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55, 57, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). But see Jn re
Application of U.S. for a Material Witness Warrant, 213 F. Supp. 2d 287, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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for propositions that lack support. Future application of these cases,
therefore, must be sharply circumscribed.

